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 Abstract 
With the Kyoto Protocol in effect and well into its implementation period, the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are 
now in the midst of negotiating an agreement to govern the global policy on 
climate change in the post-Kyoto period. Recognizing the difficulties of the 
Parties to agree on the commitments laid out in the Kyoto Protocol and 
acknowledging in particular the aspects of justice related to the responsibility for 
the origin as well as the mitigation of global warming, this thesis investigates the 
ideas of justice prevailing in the negotiations of climate change.  
Using a two-step methodology of concept analysis and analysis of ideas, a 
conceptual map is first created, built on the constitutive dimensions of justice as 
drawn from political philosophy. Using the results therein as theoretical 
framework, analysis of ideas is then applied to the high-level statements at the 
preparatory 14th Conference of Parties (COP 14) in Poznan held in December 
2008.  
With the conceptual map as reference, two main positions are identified 
embodied by the perceived conceptions of developed and developing countries 
respectively, separated primarily in the dimensions of principle and reach. These 
positions are to be considered as stylized however, and should be viewed in 
conjunction with the underlying dimensional description.  
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No theory of justice can long remain on the luxurious level of 
philosophical speculation without diving down into the particularities of 
social life, but no attempts to solve the problems of daily politics can long sustain 
without reaching up to the heights of philosophy, struggling as Socrates struggled 
to come to grips with the definition of justice, with its essential nature and 
justification.” 
“ 
R. C. Solomon & M. C. Murphy (2000:4) 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to negotiations on climate change 
The prospect of a changing climate has been known or in any case suspected for 
at least half a century and the process of negotiating mitigations has been going 
on for almost two decades1. The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) which entered into force in 1994 became the first 
step towards a global climate change regime and to date it has been ratified by 
192 countries and enjoys broad support (UNFCCC 2009a). In Article 2 to the 
Convention, it is stated that 
 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system… (United Nations 1992: 4). 
 
This rather vague objective was an effect of the parties having different opinions 
on the need for action which also resulted in non-binding, rather than binding, 
targets for emission reductions. However, at the first Conference of the Parties2 
(COP 1) in 1995 it was adopted that the commitments were insufficient in order 
to meet the long term objective. This led to the negotiation of the Kyoto protocol, 
specifying binding targets for Annex I-countries3 for the period of 2008-2012. 
Although it was adopted in 1997, technical details delayed the ratification and in 
the end important players such as Australia and not least the United States 
declared they would not ratify, one major reason being that developing countries 
(including large emitters like China and India) would not need to reduce 
emissions. These setbacks notwithstanding, the Kyoto Protocol entered into 
force in 2005 after securing the needed ratifications of 50 per cent of the Annex I 
parties (Betsill 2005: 108-117; Schreurs 2004: 208; UNFCCC 2009d). 
                                                 
1 It was first discovered by Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius in 1896. His warnings were however ignored 
until the 1950’s (Betsill 2005: 105). 
2 This is the “supreme-body” of the Convention, its highest decision making authority in which all parties 
to the convection are represented – that is the 192 countries that has ratified it. The COP meets annually, 
the last time being in December 2008 in Poznan, Poland (UNFCCC 2009b, 2009c).  
3 “Industrialized countries and formerly communist countries with economies in transition” – referred to 
as Annex I parties since they are mentioned in the first annex of the UNFCCC (Betsill 2005: 109). 
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 With the Kyoto Protocol having entered into force and a being good year into its 
implementation period, negotiations for the post-Kyoto period are now well 
under way and an agreement is planned to be reached at COP 15 in Copenhagen 
in December 2009. 
1.2 Purpose and research question 
The phenomenon of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases warming the 
Earth’s surface is interchangeably referred to as climate change and global 
warming. We make no difference between the terms here except in noting the 
explicitness expressed by the latter as regards to its reach – it is indeed a global 
environmental problem and as such it poses a great challenge for mitigation. It 
requires cooperation on a global scale where costs and sacrifices need to be 
divided between the different actors (Betsill 2005: 103). How is this to be done? 
Who is responsible for the origin of the problem and who should see to its 
solution? 
These questions were central to negotiating the Kyoto Protocol where the 
difficulties in finding their answers were proven. Indeed, as stated in the previous 
section, the United States – one of the most important players and largest 
emitters – has yet today not ratified the agreement, pleading spatial aspects of 
justice and scientific uncertainty as main reasons (Schreurs 2004; UNFCCC 
2009d). With this in mind, as well as the widely discussed temporal or 
intergenerational aspect (cf. Dobson 1999; Page 1999), the concept of justice 
seems to have far-reaching implications and the different conceptions of justice 
held by the parties to the convention seem to be of great importance for the 
outcome of these negotiations.  
How then is the concept of justice applied in the negotiations for a post-
Kyoto agreement on mitigating climate change? New winds are blowing in 
Washington and stronger scientific evidence has been put forward as indicated by 
the change of administration in the United States and the fourth assessment 
report of IPCC respectively (Broder 2008; RA 2009: 9; Pachauri & Reisinger 
2007: 30). What then, are the prospects for a perceived fair deal to come out of 
the COP 15 in Copenhagen? 
The purpose of this thesis is to map out prevailing ideas of justice against a 
background of conceptual analysis drawing on political philosophy. Accordingly, 
the research question can be formulated as follows. 
 
 What ideas of justice prevail in international climate change negotiations? 
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 1.3 Delimitations 
In doing research on the concept of justice we face delicate problems of 
delimitation. As will be elaborated further in section 3.1 the amount of literature 
concerning the subject is extensive. Delimitations will be needed due to 
restrictions in both time and space and the focus will therefore be to identify 
constitutive aspects sufficient to create the analytical tool needed for the analysis. 
The discussion will be held on a rather superficial level going only as deep as 
needed. Using a descriptive and not a normative approach, there will be no need 
to engage in more than to present different views. 
Regarding the analysis of ideas it will be limited to the negotiations, or 
rather high-level statements, at one COP only and only groups of states will be 
regarded. Exceptions are made however for large important countries such as the 
United States, China, Russia and India. Also the civil society groups making 
statements at the COP will be included. 
1.4 Disposition 
In this chapter a rather short and general background is given to the negotiations 
on climate change, whereas the background of the concept of justice has 
deliberately been placed in chapter three in order to achieve a cohesive 
presentation of the theoretical framework. Following up this introductory 
chapter, the second chapter gives a presentation of the methodology to be used 
and also include a presentation of the empirical material. 
The theoretical framework is then as mentioned laid out in chapter three 
and includes an introduction to the concept of justice as well as the compiling and 
describing of its constitutive dimensions. In chapter four, the theoretical 
framework is applied to the empirical material in the investigating of prevailing 
ideas of justice. The results are then discussed in chapter five, taking up possible 
shortcomings of the methodological and theoretical approach as well as the 
analysis and the material used. The thesis is then concluded in chapter six, 
offering a short recapitulation of the purpose and a response to the research 
question. 
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 2 Methodology 
Introducing methodology in research of value concepts requires one to relate to 
the philosophy of social science. The stance taken in questions regarding 
ontology and epistemology has an outright effect on the results of research and 
must thus for the sake of intersubjectivity be discussed. This thesis being 
empirical rather than normative in its methodological approach, let be that value 
concepts constitute part of the empirical material, we can however avoid the 
controversy regarding to what extent value concepts can be made subjects for 
scientific research. One could argue that certain concepts e.g. justice has an 
uncontroversial positive value, making a discussion on whether it is to be 
considered good or desirable obsolete – an unequivocally positive value seem 
very likely to be desirable. We shall however not deepen this discussion further 
but assume that it is sufficient to adopt a position allowing for meaningful 
interpretation of statements referring to certain ideas, thus implying a position 
somewhere between objective and relative epistemology (Badersten 2006: 64c; 
Hansson 2001: 17cc; Kymlicka 1995: 16). 
2.1 A two-step approach 
As presented in the introduction, the purpose of the thesis is to map out the ideas 
of justice in negotiations on climate change. Recognizing the complexity of the 
concept and the vast literature discussing the different aspects of justice, it seems 
only logic to make use of existing definitions as a starting point for further 
analysis4. This approach would thus follow the understanding that concepts 
crucial to the analysis must be given clear definitions in order to be of any value. 
Applying concept analysis as a method of structuring the various aspects of justice 
found in the literature offers a way to accomplish this and will thus constitute the 
first step towards our purpose (Badersten 2006:43c; Beckman 2007:31). This 
first step will also involve the creation of a theoretical framework built upon the 
various conceptions found in the literature5. 
                                                 
4 The simple fact that political philosophers from Plato to modern times have struggled with the question 
of how justice should be understood should prove the complexity of the concept as well as indicate the 
vastness of literature concerning it (Solomon & Murphy 2000). 
5 Campbell (1988) offers a more rigorous approach in relating to the possible problems of different 
spheres of justice, thus giving his representation of justice a more general application that can be adjusted 
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 Following the first step of concept analysis and theorizing, the results from 
therein will be used in carrying out a descriptive analysis of ideas prevailing in 
negotiations on climate change. It could be expressed as if the first step entails 
creating a conceptual map of justice, which is applied to an empirical material and 
thus guiding the structuring of ideas. Accordingly, the first step is closely 
connected to the creation of theory while the second step applies and utilizes the 
theory6. 
The two steps of concept analysis and descriptive analysis of ideas will be 
individually elaborated in the following sections. This concerns only 
methodological issues – the theoretical framework will be discussed and 
elaborated in chapter three. Notice that for practical reasons, we will start with the 
analysis of ideas. 
2.1.1 Descriptive analysis of ideas 
Bergström & Boréus describes analysis of ideas as a method used when the 
purpose is to shed light on the different ideas prevailing in a certain debate or 
regarding a certain issue (2005:154). Settling for this to be a satisfactory way of 
sorting out the various ideas in the negotiations we may then embark on 
describing the method. Noting first that it has previously been expressed that the 
concept analysis will provide the basis for creating the theory needed to carry out 
the analysis of ideas, we shall here need to specify in what manner the 
conceptions of justice are to be categorized. As typology we can utilize either ideal 
types or dimensions, both which will be briefly elaborated prior to presenting the 
most suited. 
Ideal types, perhaps most commonly associated with Max Weber, only exist 
in theory. They are isolated facts resembling caricatures and originally used to 
form hypotheses, although they may also be used as a kind of map for screening 
texts and sorting wordings in conceptual boxes (Bergström & Boréus 2005:159c). 
Dimensions are in comparison more general and often emanate from 
political philosophy. Bergström & Boréus (2005:164) exemplifies with a study 
using dimensions of several concepts through which the ideas of a certain political 
party is analysed over time. Perhaps better suited for the purpose of this thesis is 
Beckmans characterization of dimensions as scales that can measure several 
different values, sort of like a variable (2007:51). This approach also point out the 
necessary in comparing a phenomenon with an analytical tool as reference (cf. 
Lundquist 1993:101cc). 
                                                                                                                                                        
to the good or subject of analysis. This is deliberately ignored in this thesis for the sake of delimitation, as 
well as the fact that we deal here only with one subject. 
6 Although they use a slightly different application Esaiasson et al. (2007) discuss different methods of 
theorizing including creation, using and altering which will all, to more or less extent, be used in this thesis. 
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 Considering that dimensions can be more easily created, and relating this to 
limitations of space and time (cf. section 1.3), this method is recognized as the 
most useful to help create the analytical tool – the conceptual map7 (cf. 
Bergström & Boréus (2005:172). The creation and functioning of the dimensions 
will be further discussed in the next section on concept analysis. 
2.1.2 Concept analysis 
Concept analysis is the foundation for creating a solid theory to be used in the 
analysis of ideas – it is thus imperative that it is systematic and coherent in 
method (cf. Beckman 2005: 31). In achieving this, we will here proceed by 
acknowledging two stages of analysis. 
At the first stage we need to understand the general approach where we will 
distinguish between the linguistic term, the concept meaning and the phenomena. 
The relationship between the three can be depicted schematically by the semantic 
triangle shown in figure 1a, which will aid us in illustrating that the term – being a 
word or a name – expresses or defines the meaning of the concept which is an 
idea or a notion referring to certain phenomena (Teorell & Svensson 2007:37f; 
Badersten 2006:83-86; Sartori 1984: 22-28). All three can create interpretive 
difficulties, albeit for different reasons. Improperly defined, the first might be 
ambiguous whilst the second may give rise to vagueness if lacking clear 
delimitations regarding what instances of the third – phenomena – should fall 
under its meaning (Beckman 2007:31-35; Badersten 2006:83-86; Sartori 1984: 
25-27). 
We may take the opportunity here to exemplify this with the word value 
which is used extensively throughout this text using two different meanings. 
Firstly it is given the meaning of ethical or moral values and as such it 
encompasses phenomena such as liberty and justice. Secondly it is given the 
meaning of a value indicating a measured level on a certain scale e.g. a dimension. 
Henceforth, we shall distinguish between them by referring to the former as an 
ethical or moral value. 
Moving on, we must also recognize that a concept can be defined at 
different levels of abstraction and we may designate a broad definition as being at 
the highest level. If we assume this to be the plausible general understanding of 
the concept it will naturally comprise the whole field of more specific definitions 
but since it is both ambiguous and vague it will not be very useful. Rather, we 
must take a step down on the ladder of abstraction to find narrower and more 
precise definitions of the concept that are useable to distinguish the different 
phenomena in the empirical material to be used. As can be seen from figure 1b, in 
moving from abstract to concrete we gain in a concepts intension, which is the  
                                                 
7 This is also the approach utilized by Dobson (1998) as is discussed in chapter 3 on theory.  
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Figure 1a. The semantic triangle 
(Source: Teorell & Svensson 2007: 37). 
Figure 1b. The relationship between 
concept intension and extension 
(Source: Badersten 2006: 87). 
number of criteria to be fulfilled for a phenomenon to fall under a certain concept. 
Simultaneously, we lose in the concepts extension which is the actual number of 
phenomena that can be assigned to a certain concept (Badersten 2006:86-92; cf. 
Sartori 1984: 25-28).  
Finally, and closely related to concept intension and extension, we must in 
specifying and making concepts precise be careful not to engage in conceptual 
stretching – that is we must not move up on the ladder of abstraction, increasing 
the concept extension, without decreasing the concept intension. Or, expressing it 
somewhat different, we may not make the concept more general without 
removing concrete criteria needed to be fulfilled (ibid.: 92f). 
Having laid out the basic method for concept analysis, we may now move 
on to the next stage where we will need to return to the different kinds of 
typology, ideal types and dimensions, which were discussed in the previous 
section. Had we decided to use ideal types we would not need to elaborate further 
on the method described above. In identifying different ideal types it would have 
been clear at what level of abstraction they would fit in, e.g. distributional justice 
and procedural justice could be specified and placed at the same level of 
abstraction. If we wanted to move down on the ladder of abstraction, we could 
simply choose to concretize distributional justice and identify e.g. justice as 
fairness or justice as entitlements. This scenario is depicted in figure 2. 
Now, this is to be conferred to using the typology of dimensions where the 
concept is dissected into two or more dimensions – a kind of variable – which are 
assigned values and where it is possible that each dimension has its own ladder of 
abstraction, as depicted in figure 3. Hence, it does not exclude the existence of 
two or more dimensions at different levels of abstraction (cf. Repstad 
2007:142cc; Lundquist 1993:101cc). This corresponds to  Campbell’s approach 
where the concept analysis is divided into two levels where the first level comprise 
the overarching or general meaning of the concept, while the second investigates 
the competing interpretations – conceptions – of how it should be defined in 
more concrete terms (1988: Ch. 1). In likewise manner Perelman (1963:16f) 
argues that justice should be construed as having two levels, a formal or abstract 
one, being of a very general nature, and a variable one holding all the different 
interpretations of this general notion. The method used here is thus rather like 
Level of 
abstraction
Intension
Extension
Term Concept meaning
Phenomena
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 the ones utilized by Campbell and Perelman, with the distinction that it is more 
general in its specification, allowing for several dimensions and analysis at several 
levels of abstraction. 
 
 
B
Distributive
Term B
Concept B
Phenomena B
C
Procedural
Term C
Concept C
Phenomena C
A
Retributive
Term A
Concept A
Phenomena A
B1
Fairness
Term B1
Concept B1
Phenomena B1
B2
Entitlement
Term B2
Concept B2
Phenomena B2
Justice
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of ideal types and levels of abstraction. 
(Source: Draws on Badersten 2006: 84) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of dimensions and levels of abstraction. 
(Source: Draws on Dobson 1998: 63) 
 
JusticeA B
C
A1 Distributional
Procedural
Fairness
Entitlements
A2
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 The two different scenarios are compatible however as one can combine the 
values of different dimensions and thus create positions, or conceptions, which 
can be thought of as a kind of ideal types. These conceptions are, as the concept 
in itself, defined by a term and refers to phenomena falling under its meaning 
making it possible to depict them according to figure 2. 
2.2 Empirical material 
2.2.1  Conceptions of justice 
The focus for the concept analysis will be on political-philosophical thought and 
the literature used should thus be of that character. Recognizing that the literature 
covering the concept of justice is immense, notwithstanding the rather obvious 
limitation to political philosophy rather than philosophy at large, the idea is to use 
surveys as a starting point and guide. Creating in that fashion a base for 
understanding the various aspects of justice, the original texts will only be used as 
reference should it be required. 
2.2.2  Instances of just phenomena 
In order for the descriptive analysis of ideas to be relevant the material used 
should present a broad picture of negotiations on climate change. This said it is 
important that is not too broad with risk of losing relevancy. The Kyoto Protocol 
applies through the year 2012, although with the COP 15 coming up the focus is 
more and more shifting to the post-Kyoto timeframe. In an effort to stay at the 
front of the negotiations on the upcoming agreement, the negotiations held at the 
COP-14 in Poznan thus will be used. 
Considering that decisions and resolutions may be compromises; we will 
here use statements from the high-level segment delivered by recognized groups 
of states in order to capture the original ideas. Most likely there will have been 
compromises within each group as well, it is however a trade off between level of 
originality and practicability and it is thus assumed here that the formation of 
groups reflects common interests as well as common ideas of justice. In addition 
to the groups of states, statements from civil society will also be used in order to 
broaden the field of ideas. 
As printed versions of the statements are not available, the official webcasts 
will be used and the necessary references will thus be transcribed. 
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 3 Theory – a conceptual map of justice 
3.1 Introduction to the concept of justice 
The concept of justice has been on the agenda for more than two millennia, 
starting with Plato in about 380 BC who, in the words of Solomon and Murphy, 
“canonized the question, ‘What is justice?,’ as one of the leading questions of 
philosophy.” (2000:21) Consequently, there have been put forward a great 
number of meanings and theories of justice over time, a fact most easily verified 
by consulting the abundance of anthologies on the subject (e.g. Ryan 1993; 
Solomon & Murphy 2000; Fisk 1993). 
In a metaphorical approach, Lebacqz designates the multitude of theoretical 
contributions as fragments of justice and gives the following comparison. 
 
Justice is thus a bit like the proverbial elephant examined by blindfolded explorers. Each 
feels a different part – the foot, the ears, the tusks – and consequently each describes the 
beast differently – gnarled and tough, thin and supple, smooth and hard. The elephant 
itself – justice – is not encompassed by any of the individual descriptions. At times they 
seem incompatible. And yet, each contributes something to its definition (1986:9). 
 
One can maintain a number of attitudes to these different understandings or 
fragments of justice, e.g. (1) that only one can be right, which is possibly related 
to the standpoint that (2) they have nothing in common, or (3) that there in fact 
is some common denominator between them (Perelman 1963: 10c). We shall 
here dismiss the first as there is no one right understanding of justice, only 
normative positions acting as antagonists between themselves and it is not our 
purpose here to champion any such position (ibid.: 52c). The latter two are more 
complicated and closely connected to the notion that Gallie (1955) in an 
influential article referred to as essentially contested concept, meaning in a rather 
simplified and shortened version that “[w]hen disagreement does not simply 
reflect different readings of evidence within a fully shared system of concepts, we 
can say that a conceptual dispute has arisen.”8 (Connolly 1993:10) This does not 
mean however that it is impossible to analyze such a concept for as long as it is 
                                                 
8 In a more precise description, a concept should be considered essentially contested if it is “appraisive in 
that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement, when the practice described is internally 
complex in that its characterization involves reference to several dimensions, and when the agreed and 
contested rules of application are relatively open, enabling parties to interpret even those shared rules 
differently as new and unforeseen situations arise” (Connolly 1993:10). 
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 clearly defined it does not matter that is extremely vague, that can be solved by 
using the ladder of abstraction to concretize9 (see section 2.1.2).  
Hence, it will be considered that from the different versions of justice a 
common definition can be derived, acting as the most abstract description of the 
concept of justice, in the literature referred varyingly as the concept of justice or 
formal justice where the more specific understandings or versions is referred to as 
conceptions of justice or concrete justice (Campbell 1988: 3-6; Perelman 1963: 
11c; Rawls 1971: 5). The definition of formal justice, or the most abstract notion 
of justice can, as done by legal philosopher Hart, be put as “equal treatment of 
equal cases” (cited in Hansson 2001: 21) although there are variations, e.g. 
“…beings of one and the same essential category must be treated the same way” 
(Perelman 1963: 16) or in Millers terms: “the just state of affairs is that in which 
each individual has exactly those benefits and burdens which are due to him“ – 
which he goes on to elaborate in saying that “the important question about justice 
emerge when we try to settle what a person’s ‘due’ actually means” (cited in 
Campbell 1988: 4). Although the variants presented obviously differ somewhat in 
language, and possibly in the version of justice10, they share the property of being 
rather loose definitions which requires further concretization – which is best 
characterized by Miller in his clarifying elaboration. 
We may exemplify this reasoning by using the above quote of Lebacqz. 
What is perhaps not obvious in that interpretation is the distinction between 
formal and concrete justice. One can perhaps interpret the “fragments” as pieces 
of concrete justice which, when combined, sums up to formal justice. This view 
does not however take into account that the merged theory will inherit concrete 
properties from the several “fragments” and thus not qualify as the more abstract 
definition of formal justice, or it would be making the error of conceptual 
stretching as described above. Although the metaphor was probably not intended 
for this, it serves well as an illustration of the distinction of formal and concrete 
justice as well as conceptual stretching. 
Accepting Hart’s definition of the concept to be the most general, we may 
assign this to the definition of the top box in figure 3 (labelled Justice) and go on 
defining the dimensions to be used in finding the concrete conceptions prevailing 
in the negotiations on climate change. 
 
                                                 
9 Utilizing dimensions can be seen as being immune to even the strictest interpretation of justice as an 
essentially contested concept. If contested aspects are ontological and/or epistemological positions it is 
always possible to add this dimension and thus construction the analytical tool to reveal such differences. 
This would perhaps not be meaningful, as the analytical tool would become too extensive to be of any 
practical use. 
10 Miller and Perelman can perhaps be seen as distributive versions of Harts definition, which is more 
procedural in its language. 
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 3.2 Dimensions 
Recognizing the multitude of approaches to the understanding of justice it seems 
as most useful is to derive the dimensions along which they clashes. In this way, 
we may utilize a typology of dimensions and at the same time “stand on the 
shoulders of giants” in using their theories as a guide in creating the dimensions. 
The approach will follow Dobson in specifying a number of questions relating to 
fundamental principles and aspects in theories of justice, where the answers make 
up the preliminary scope of each dimension (1998:7). The method will diverge 
however, at least initially, in broadening the view to encapsulate more than just 
social (or distributive) justice. The resulting matrix will allow us to in the analysis 
assign to each idea of justice an appropriate value on the scale of each dimension. 
The scale will be continuous so that, should there be a stance representing a cross 
of two (or more) values, this can be dealt with (cf. Perelman 1963:32cc). 
In constructing the analytical tool the dimensions deemed to be important 
for finding ideas of justice will be included and – while considering Ockham’s 
razor11 – if there is any ambiguity regarding the usefulness of a dimension, it will 
be used since we will always have the possibility of discarding it when presenting 
the resulting map of justice. 
3.2.1  The Principle of Justice 
A crucial part in uncovering the concept of justice and its different conceptions is 
to ask of a theory or an idea: what has value? – a question whose response will 
provide us with the fundamental principle of the theory or idea and thus one of 
the pieces needed to identify different conceptions of justice (Perelman 1963: 
27,56,61). 
To this question we find an abundance of responses in the political-
philosophical literature. Here we will just touch the surface in order to map out a 
few that have been important in shaping the debate. It is suitable to start off with 
Rawls as his theory is commonly taken as a reference point in modern political 
philosophy12 (Kymlicka 1995:17; Solomon & Murphy 2000: 6). In “A theory of 
justice” (1971) Rawls lays down his basic idea that inequalities are only allowed if 
                                                 
11 The principle of Ockham’s razor states that “entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily” (Nordin 
2003: 211c). 
12 It should however be recognized that Rawls himself takes utilitarianism as a reference point (cf. Rawls 
1971: 3). The basic constituent component in utilitarianism is, as the name implies, utility and the 
fundamental principle is that of maximizing the sum of utility. The right action is thus “the one that 
maximizes utility, e.g. the one that satisfies as many enlightened preferences as possible” (Kymlicka 
1995:27; cf. Mill 1910). Rawls argues (among others) that utilitarianism is not a fair theory of justice, 
since it does not take into account the possible inequality created through an action where only a few gains 
a lot whereas a great many gains nothing or perhaps becomes slightly worse off (Rawls 1971: 22-27). 
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 they gain the worst off members of society. This idea is elaborated in and guided 
by two principles of justice; the first specifies equal liberties and the second 
specify most possible utility to the worst off and equal possibilities. According to 
Rawls these are the only principles of justice that can be agreed upon behind a veil 
of ignorance in the original position – a thought experiment used as an argument of 
justification (Rawls 1971: 17-22; cf. Kymlicka 1990: Ch. 3). 
As a response to Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness Nozick presented his 
entitlement theory in 1974. It assumes that each has right to his present holdings 
and a just distribution is one that results from exchanges on a free market – a 
distribution that results from a just process is in itself just13 (Kymlicka 1995:102). 
There are three main principles in Nozick’s entitlement theory; the first specifies 
that “everything that has been acquired in a just manner, may freely be sold to 
others”, the second specifies how to decide whether what has been acquired have 
actually been done so in a just fashion, the third specifies how to deal with 
holdings that have been acquired in an unjust fashion (ibid.; cf. Nozick 1974: 
150cc). 
Both Rawls’s and Nozick’s theories are examples of proportionally 
egalitarian theories. A pure egalitarian theory would instead specify that the only 
principle of justice should be that everybody must be treated in exactly the same 
way. Marxism is an example of an egalitarian theory in materialistic terms.14 
(Perelman 1963: 17; Kymlicka 1990: 169cc; cf. Marx 1993). 
Condensing these different theories into principles we get the following 
results; “to the benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls), “entitlement” (Nozick), 
“equality” (pure egalitarianism), “needs” (Marxism) and “utility” (Utilitarianism, 
see footnote 12) (cf. Dobson 1998: 63). 
Arler (2001) gives a few examples of what he calls distributive criteria which 
are in line with those specified above and which are useful in distinguishing 
different views in the statements given at the high-level segment in Poznan. In 
order to be coherent we will henceforth refer to his criteria as principles. He lists 
five different principles: (1) simple equality, defined as “if no good reasons can be 
given to behave differently towards any of the affected parties within a given circle 
of relationship, all parties should be treated equally”, (2) desert, defined such that 
“those who contribute most to the problem…should pay the price, and/or take 
the lead in remedying the damage and/or in compensating the victims whenever 
this would be an option, (3) needs and abilities, defined such that “the heaviest 
burdens are put on the broadest shoulders” and that “the weakest parties…are 
relieved more or less from their burdens”, (4) usage or prescriptive rights, defined 
such that “any distribution of rights and responsibilities as far as possible should 
be made in accordance with status quo, or at least that status quo should be 
                                                 
13 Nozick’s theory is only valid if ones holdings have been acquired legitimately. For a discussion on the 
problem of how to show this, and how it is solved if one cannot, see Kymlicka 1995:115-117. 
14 In the final stage of Marxism there will be an abundance of resources available to everyone, there will 
therefore be not conflicts and hence no need for justice. 
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 accepted as the baseline for further regulations” and that “[t]he countries which 
have the largest emissions, and which accordingly have been used to having 
access to this global common, should keep their rights either in absolute or in 
relative terms”, (5) chance or luck, defined such that “[n]atural and historical 
chance alone determine the baseline point of reference”. 
The usefulness of these principles should be apparent in their compliance 
with the principles drawn from political philosophy combined with their well 
adapted definitions as regards to the environmental aspect. 
3.2.2  Normative Logic 
Intimately connected with the principle of justice is the question of what 
normative logic should be used to “judge the justice of a given situation” (Dobson 
1998:70). We may exemplify here with the contrasting positions taken by Rawls 
and Dworkin on the one hand and Nozick on the other. The first position asserts 
that “[j]ustice is a matter of outcomes: a political decision causes injustice, 
however fair the procedures that produced it, when it denies people some 
resource, liberty or opportunity that the best theories of justice entitle them to” 
(Dworkin, cited in Dobson 1998: 70) whereas the latter argues that “[w]hatever 
arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just” (Nozick, cited in Dobson 
1998: 70). Since it is used to determine how one should judge the justness of 
something we must consider if it is even possible to determine. Suppose that the 
situation to be judged is the climate change agreement in Copenhagen, the goal of 
the COP 14 in Poznan. What we need to try and identify then is what the 
statements express about how this is to be judged. 
3.2.3  Community of Justice 
As noted by Arler, climate change “is not just a problem for the people who are or 
will be immediately affected by the adverse effects. It is a common problem for 
the global community as such…” (2001: 302). But what beings are comprised in 
this community? For several of the modern political philosophers, including 
Rawls and Walzer, conceptions of justice applies to persons, both present and 
future generations. It is more uncertain whether animals and non-sentients 
should be included in the community of justice (Campbell 1988: 11c; cf. Dobson 
1998: 66). Benton argues that humans “have a responsibility to do justice to non-
human inhabitants of the habitats which are liable to be altered by human action” 
(cited in Dobson 1998:67). Barry argues, on the other hand, that “justice and 
injustice can be predicated only of relations who are regarded as equals in the 
sense that they weigh equally in the moral scales” (cited in Dobson 1998: 67). 
Recognizing the different understandings to what beings are able to be recipients 
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 of justice we may however establish that present generation human beings are the 
only ones capable of dispensing justice, hence it is not needed to divide this 
dimension further – we will simply assume this to be the case and settle for 
identifying recipients when analyzing the material (cf. Dobson 1998: 64cc).  
3.2.4  Level of Analysis 
Even though Rawls original work from 1971 is intended for use within closed 
communities it is still, as we have seen above, used in broader matters (cf. Dobson 
1998). For issues concerning cooperation on the more global arena Rawls did 
however develop a second theory of justice called “The Law of Peoples” (1999). 
As indicated in the title it uses peoples rather than states which by some is 
interpreted as a critique against the state-centric realism prevalent in international 
politics (Brock 2009: 30). Arguing for a yet lower level of analysis we find the 
cosmopolitarians stating “the equal worth of all individuals, no matter where they 
happen to be situated on the planet and what borders separate them for one 
another”. 
We may also designate the value of certain groups, such as women, to this 
dimension – allowing identification of conceptions where a certain issue, e.g. 
gender, is emphasized (Moller Okin 2000). 
Although the analytical level at which negotiations are held will most likely 
be the state, it is important to acknowledge these views differing in analytical 
level.  
3.2.5  Reach 
Being a difficult dimension to give a short and easy to understand title, it should 
firstly be explained that it involves how the principle of justice should be applied 
and has two possible values; universality and particularity. The two represent the 
different positions of two different strands in political philosophy, individualism 
and communitarianism. The latter adopts particularity, arguing that “community 
constitutes a common culture, which is the precondition for moral autonomy” 
(Avineri & de-Shalit 1992: 4) and that “[u]niversal and absolute justice…is but 
another illusion of individualism” (ibid.). Individualists on the other hand argue 
for universality believing that “withdrawal from one’s society and culture may 
help the philosopher find answers to moral dilemmas. Moral principles…are 
universal and capable of being discovered…if the philosopher practices 
philosophy in a ‘detached’ way (ibid.: p. 7; cf. Dobson 1998: 71c) 
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 3.2.6  Reference 
The dimension of reference indicates whether particular cases should be 
compared to other cases within a larger group in order to be judged as just or 
unjust, or if they should be compared individually to an objective standard. 
Campbell argues that “when there is competition…to escape burdens which 
must fall on somebody, comparisons are inevitable involved” (1988: 14). As a 
solution, we will thus separate direct comparisons to other entities from comparisons 
made in reference to a common goal (ibid.). In terms of climate change negotiations 
we may then decide to differentiate between comparisons to other countries or 
groups while comparisons to official documents such as the Kyoto Protocol or the 
Bali Action Plan are accepted. 
3.2.7  Version 
Since distributive justice (or social justice) is dominating the literature the main 
focus will be on this version of justice. This dimension will however be included 
in order to intercept other versions, should they be explicitly expressed. 
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 4 Analysis 
In accordance with previous chapter, we will here present the questions 
underlying the several dimensions to each of the statements made in Poznan. The 
main focus will be statements made by the groups of states; G7715 and China, EU, 
AOSIS, the Umbrella group, the African group and LDC. As was briefly outlined 
in the introduction, statements made by the several civil society groups will also 
be taken under consideration. Being more specialized and profiled than the 
groups of states we can perhaps not expect to find a response to all questions. It is 
believed however that their contribution will add more depth to the analysis, 
revealing more values of the dimensions that would otherwise be found. As 
expressed by the president of COP 
 
Our intergovernmental processes always appreciate active participation from civil society. 
We would like to warmly welcome these organizations to the high-level segment and invite 
them to continue to play their indispensable role. Through them, we are better linked to 
the millions of individuals around the world who are concerned about the threat of the 
global warming and taking action against it (UNFCCC 2008c: 04.18.2516). 
 
Before presenting the results of the analysis it should be noted that the dimension 
of normative logic has been discarded. Although it have been for many of the 
dimensions difficult to find explicit referral, it was hard to find any statement that 
even implicitly argued for any particular normative logic. One can suspect that the 
teleological position is more common, implying that the negotiations would be 
just only if the outcome is just. However, since we have no empirical material to 
support this we must leave this discussion for now. 
It should also be noted that the dimension of version will not be needed 
since there have been no such indications in the statements and the principles 
identified sort under distributive justice. 
 
                                                 
15 The G77 contains the African group, AOSIS, and LDC. They will however still be analyzed separately as 
it might reveal differences within the G77 (UNFCCC  2009e). 
16 Since the statements are taken from webcasts, instead of page the time of the quote will be given. 
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 4.1 Dimensional values 
4.1.1  Principle 
In order to identify principles of justice in the different statements, we will utilize 
the different principles given by Arler (cf. chapter 3.2.1) and combine them with 
two important principles in environmental governance; the polluter pays 
principle (PPP) and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility 
(CBDR). PPP states that “costs of pollution should be borne by those responsible 
for causing the pollution and the consequential costs” (Sands & Peel 2005: 56). 
CBDR is, in turn, defines that “all states have a common responsibility” although 
“it is necessary to take account of differing circumstances, particularly in relation 
to…causing…and…ability to respond to the threat” (ibid.: p.54). 
Several spokespersons expressed in their statements the need for developed 
(or Annex I) countries to take the lead and/or to show leadership. Mr. Quarless, 
representative of AOSIS, expressed the need for “all countries to make significant 
contributions to emission reductions, led by developed countries” (UNFCCC 
2008b: 17.15). China also pressed for this in their statement, expressing the 
following: 
 
[D]eveloped countries should take the lead in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions… 
Meanwhile they should also fulfil their commitments under the convention and the 
[Kyoto] protocol by supporting developing countries… For their part the developing 
countries should also take positive and effective mitigation and adaptation measures in the 
context of sustainable development and with the support of developed countries 
(UNFCCC 2008d: 02.19.42). 
 
This is a position that is in line with the principle of CBDR which seems to be a 
common idea of how collective action is to be principally organized. It is natural 
therefore to investigate what principle of justice it is derived from. In comparing 
with Arler (2001) his second principle, “needs and abilities” is compatible with 
CBDR (cf. chapter 3.2.1). 
There are some statements that could be interpreted as being built on 
CBDR, but they could also be built on PPP, e.g. Mr. Shareef who on behalf of 
LDC stated that “we must reaffirm that Annex I countries must cut emissions first 
and most” (UNFCCC 2008b: 35.10) which implies PPP as a possible governing 
principle, at least in a transitional period. Also the above quotes of AOSIS and 
China imply that PPP should be utilized in calling for the developed countries to 
lead (cf. chapter 3.2.1). In terms of justice PPP corresponds to the principle of 
desert (cf. Campbell 1988:21; Arler 2001). 
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 Mr. Ashe, speaking on behalf of G77 and China, made a statement in line with the 
PPP and the principle of desert in expressing that 
 
[W]e need at a minimum to start discussions on how annex 1 parties intend to reduce their 
emissions now… The current approach of annex 1 parties – to demand as a precondition 
for action on their long term outstanding commitments binding action by others – borders 
on the immoral and is counterproductive (UNFCCC 2008b: 05.57). 
 
Mr. Quarless of AOSIS hinted again at PPP and hence the principle of desert in 
expressing the following passage. 
 
The world cannot and should not ask small island states to sign a suicide agreement that 
causes our homeland to disappear, especially when our contribution to the problem has 
been miniscule (UNFCCC 2008b: 15.00). 
 
Mr. Shareef of LDC joined the other groups of developing countries in raising 
demands in line with PPP 
 
We will call upon the Annex 1 countries to make financial commitment to developing 
countries particularly the most vulnerable LDCs (UNFCCC 2008b: 38.49). 
 
The Umbrella group gave a rather vague statement that is difficult to interpret, 
using no more concrete language than that they “would like to increase the 
ambition of [the parties] negotiations, so that [the parties] can move from 
sharing ideas to laying the groundwork for a successful outcome in Copenhagen” 
(UNFCCC 2008b: 19.10). With the strong emphasis on shared responsibility 
without mentioning explicitly any differentiated ditto, they do however represent 
the view being closest to that which Arler (2001) refers to as simple equality. This 
view is strengthened when considering the following passage expressed by Ms. 
Dobriansky, representative of the USA. 
 
We have seen growing recognition that any environmentally effective solution to climate 
change requires robust actions from all major economies. The world has evolved 
dramatically since the early 1990’s and the post 2012 arrangement must reflect these 
changes (UNFCCC 2008d: 02.10.45). 
 
Considering also the fact that the USA supports the Bali Action Plan, which 
contains clear references to differentiated responsibilities (UNFCCC 2009f: 3), 
this implies that their position is somewhere between simple equality and needs 
and abilities. 
Like the Umbrella group, the statement by Ms. Kosciusko Morizet on 
behalf on the EU is rather hard to interpret. It is emphasized that a low-carbon 
society would be a more just society and the fact that the union is willing to 
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 reduce emissions regardless of the result in Copenhagen, they will be considered 
to take a position somewhere in between the principles of desert and needs and 
abilities. 
As regards to the African group, their statement gave a quite clear message 
of a desire for a principle of desert and possibly needs and abilities if its members 
are given proper support from developed countries. Mr. Lahiouel, who spoke on 
behalf of the group, expressed this by communicating that the group “think its 
necessary to begin with a legal framework for financing adaptation based on the 
historical responsibilities of those who are at the source of climate change” in 
order to “emerge from the illogical situation where the only resources identified 
are those drawn from the developing countries themselves” (UNFCCC 2008b: 
27.40). 
Notable civil society actors include Friends of the Earth International 
arguing forcefully for the responsibility of developed countries in taking the lead 
in the aspect of mitigation as well as supporting the developing countries in the 
aspect of adaptation, thus calling for a principle of desert (UNFCCC 2009c: 
04.51.35). 
4.1.2  Community 
Perhaps the clearest dimension is that of the community of justice which, as 
interpreted from the high-level statements at COP 14 in Poznan, consists of two 
main non-exclusive values – the spatial aspect of present generations and the 
temporal aspect of future generations. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon was first in line to make a statement pointing out that “the next generation 
counts on us” and that they should strive for “a deal that works for all nations, rich 
as well as poor” (UNFCCC 2008a: 12.28, 13.20). With exception for G77/China 
and the Umbrella group, all groups of states as well as several civil society groups 
recognized the importance of both the temporal and spatial aspects with the most 
powerful statements coming from the representatives of the world’s youth, 
speaking of their own future (UNFCCC 2008c: 04.18.50). The expressions range 
from language such as “the future of our children” and “responsibility of our 
generation” from EU and LDC respectively to talk of the need for financial and 
technological support for developing countries, e.g. from AOSIS; “significant 
financial resources would need to be provided for small island countries like 
ourselves, to adopt to the impacts that are already occurring and that would 
intensify in the future…these are the minimum outcomes that we expect from 
this process”.  
As regards to the G77/China, they do express the importance of the spatial 
aspect, as seen also in the quote above, although not as explicit as the other 
groups. The Umbrella group makes no explicit reference to neither the temporal 
nor the spatial aspect. They do however, as mentioned above, implicitly mention 
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 the spatial aspect by referring to the Bali Action Plan. It should be said that this is 
also done by G77/China who puts a lot of emphasis on the Bali Action Plan 
(UNFCCC 2008b: 19.10, 0.30). 
What is perhaps most surprising is that only one group of states but no civil 
society group refers to non-human beings and/or non-sentients as having an 
intrinsic value. Indeed, all three of Ms. Lefevre of the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature, Ms. Maathai, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, and Ms. 
Horner of Friends of the Earth International does mention nature and 
biodiversity but only as having extrinsic value to mankind (UNFCCC 2009c: 
04.07.20, 04.29.45, 04.51.35). It is only the African Group that, almost in passing, 
mention that human beings as a species must take “its responsibility to the planet, 
to its own survival” (UNFCCC 2009b: 24.10). 
4.1.3  Level of analysis 
It is quite clear that most statements are at the analytical level of states, or 
sometimes expressed as countries, however there are exceptions. For Mr. 
Goldtooth speaking on behalf of the International Forum for Indigenous Peoples 
the subject is peoples, who are not necessarily limited within the borders of one 
state and hence not suitable for an analytical level using that entity. Also Ms. 
Slesarenok, speaking on behalf of the Women’s Caucus, and Ms. Freitas, 
Women’s and Environment Development Organization, deviates from the state-
centric level and focus on the gender aspect. Both of these will be treated as being 
at the analytical level of a group. 
Mr. Shareef of LDC argued for a broad range in the level of analysis in 
specifying that 
 
An appropriate resource allocation methodology needs to develop taking into account 
specific characteristics of sub-national and national and sub-regional and regional 
vulnerability, combining physical, ecological, social economic and institutional aspects 
including gender sensitivity (UNFCCC 2008b: 37.30). 
 
It is perhaps a bit unclear how sub-regional is to be understood, it is clear however 
that it covers almost the whole dimension, from state to region. 
4.1.4  Reach 
The notion of particularity as one of the values of the dimension of reach is best 
expressed by Mr. Shareef on behalf of LDC: 
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 The mechanism and approaches must recognize that vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change is context specific. Adaptive capacity varies by social economic conditions 
as well as other local circumstances (UNFCCC 2008b: 37.04). 
 
This view is also shared by all developing countries; the G77/China, AOSIS and 
the African group. Opposite to this notion is that of universality, which holds that 
the same principles and measures should be enforced without regards to local 
deviations. This view is held by the Umbrella group and the European Union.  
4.1.5  Reference 
The dimension of reference was perhaps more controversial in the negotiations 
leading up to the Kyoto protocol, with the United States and Australia refusing to 
ratify the agreement knowing that large developing country emitters China and 
India would not need to. Having put mitigation goals for all parties in the Bali 
Action Plan, developed as well as developing, this dimension now seem less 
important. However, judging from the statement of the Umbrella group, this still 
seem to be a pressing issue, making them a proponent of the “comparative” aspect 
of justice. Allowing for degrees of comparativeness it can be seen as although all 
parties agree to a common responsibility, there can still be different opinions on 
how much each party should contribute. This is also put forward by the 
G77/China in reference to high-level statements at earlier meetings where it was 
expressed that emissions would be “cut by a minimum of 20 per cent and to go 
above that if all Annex I countries made similar commitments” (UNFCCC 
2008b: 3.45). 
Principally, the only ones taking a non-comparative position on this 
dimension are the ones ready to commit to emission cuts of certain amplitude 
whatever the outcome of the agreement in Copenhagen. In Poznan, his position 
was only explicitly taken by the EU who committed to reduce emissions by 20 per 
cent regardless of the result of COP 15 in Copenhagen (UNFCCC 2009b: 
08.10). 
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 Figure 4. Conceptual map of Justice. 
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 4.2  Positions on the conceptual map 
We have now identified the values of each dimension on the basis on the high-
level statements at COP 14 in Poznan and the results are represented graphically 
in figure 4. This is a dissected image of justice in climate change negotiations 
needed for a coherent and systematic analysis. It does however not say much of 
the different positions on the conceptual map. In order to highlight the different 
positions, or conceptions, we need to identify the combinations of values put 
forward in the statements. We may in that manner present the prevailing 
conceptions of justice. It should be noted also, in reference to the methodological 
aspects of concepts, that all principles are of the distributive type indicating that 
they are to be found on the concretized dimension of distributive justice (see 
figure 3). In combining the values of this dimension with the values of the other 
dimensions, conceptions are created as indicated in figure 2.  
4.2.1  The developed country position 
We see from figure 4 that the European Union and the Umbrella group17 takes a 
position that tends to favor a principle of justice equivalent to a cross between, for 
EU desert and needs and abilities and for the Umbrella group between needs and 
abilities and simple equality. These two groups also share the same understanding 
regarding the dimensions of reach and analytical level. They do however deviate 
as regards to the dimensions of reference and community of justice. 
Except from being mostly made up by industrialized countries, the two 
groups are mostly western societies which perhaps have implications for the 
position taken on the dimension on reach, illustrating the distinction between 
individualism and communitarianism (cf. section 3.2.5). 
4.2.2  The developing country position 
As opposed to the conception of the EU and the Umbrella group, the developing 
countries represented by the G77, which also includes the countries in the African 
Group and LDC, tends to favor the principle of desert. The conception held by 
developing countries is, as for developed countries, not solid. The G77 deviates 
regarding the community of justice and LDC applies a more concrete level of 
analysis. The African Group mentions the “planet” as a value to the dimension of 
the community of justice and deviates thus from all other statements. 
                                                 
17 The Umbrella group does not only consist of developed countries as described in appendix A. 
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 What may not be very surprising is that civil society groups such as Friends of the 
Earth International and Oxfam holds conceptions compatible with this position. 
4.2.3  Deviations 
The above constructed conceptions rest mainly on the principle of justice, which 
is of course very important. This does not mean however that we should not take 
into account the deviations from those conceptions or that those conceptions are 
correctly constructed. We shall focus on the first aspect here and leave the latter 
one for the overall discussion in the next chapter. 
The fact that AOSIS has been placed between desert and needs and abilities 
is due to the expression in their statement that all countries should participate in 
mitigating climate change. This can perhaps be seen as weighing rather light 
compared to the other very clear expression stating that considering their 
“miniscule” contribution to the problem they should not need to lose their 
islands.  
Most civil society groups joins in on one or sometimes two of the different 
dimensions, but does not make up any values on their own, e.g. Friends of the 
Earth International takes the value of desert concerning the dimensions of 
principle and joins the International Forum of Indigenous Peoples in taking the 
value of particularity on the dimension of reach.  
The statement presented by Mr. Lahiouel on behalf of the African Group 
was the only expressing concern for the planet “in itself”. Although sensational in 
comparison, this may be due to coincidence and is hardly enough to form a 
separate conception upon. 
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 5 Discussion 
In viewing the finished conceptual map, with the results of the concept analysis 
and the analysis of ideas, one might consider it to be rather “streamlined”, it is not 
that much variation and the variation that is present is not very surprising. This 
can of course be due to a whole range of different factors. One of the most 
important factors to consider is that it is groups of countries that have been 
analyzed and the results will consequently be affected. We would probably have 
found more exact values for the dimensions had we instead used statements from 
individual countries. As was said in the introduction, however, this is due to 
necessary delimitation.  
We need also to consider the number of dimensions, which were quite a 
few, although two were lost in the analysis of ideas since they could not be 
identified in the statements. Apart from the quantitative aspect of dimensions the 
qualitative aspect is important in order to find the ideas. It is difficult to say 
whether the loss of two dimensions was due to them being poorly chosen or 
because the statements in the material were rather vague. 
Moreover, the stance taken as regards to ontology and epistemology might 
affect, not the result perhaps but the understanding of them, e.g. a position of 
emotivism as regards to ethical or moral values would probably argue that the 
methodology is flawed, since values are then interpreted as having no meaning. 
Having explicitly specified the position taken the prerequisites for relating to the 
results from that perspective has been given. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that some of the statements are hard to 
interpret (e.g. the Umbrella group), which is problematic since it affects the 
dimensional depth. It is a however a consequence of the chosen material and 
cannot be solved without replacing or complementing the empirical material. 
This is beyond the scope of this thesis and we will then have to settle for a 
recommendation to widen (or deepen) the empirical material in future research, 
e.g. putting focus on a certain group of states in order to better uncover different 
conceptions, and thus be able to deepen as well as widen the dimensions utilized 
here. 
Recognizing these potential problems it has however been showed that 
greater differences in ideas, if there are any, must lie in other dimensions, or 
perhaps at a another level of abstraction. 
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 6 Concluding remarks 
As outlined in the introduction the purpose of this thesis has been to find the 
prevailing ideas of justice in the climate change negotiations, as expressed in the 
high-level statements given at COP 14 in Poznan in December 2008. 
In order to respond to the research question presented – what ideas that 
prevails – it is sufficient to refer to the answers given by the different statements to 
the questions underlying the specified dimensions of justice. We have also 
combined these into two positions on the conceptual map (conceptions) in order 
to illustrate the result in a perhaps more interesting manner. These conceptions 
are first and foremost separated by the dimensions of principle and reach, where 
what is called the developed country position adopts a view where the principle is to 
be defined with emphasis on needs and abilities which should be applied in a 
universalistic manner. The developing country position emphasizes instead the 
principle of desert which is to be applied in a particularistic manner. 
It should be noted though that this reduces the richness of the material and 
it should only be considered in conjunction with the underlying dimensional 
description (cf. Dobson 1998: 62cc). 
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 Appendix A – Glossary 
AOSIS  Alliance of Small Island States – 
a coalition of about 43 low-lying 
and small island countries 
(UNFCCC 2009e). 
COP  Conference of the Parties 
EU 
European Union 
G77 Group of 77 – General interest 
group of developing countries 
(UNFCCC 2009e). 
IPCC 
Intergovernmental Panel of 
Climate Change – “assesses the 
scientific, technical and socio-
economic information relevant 
for the understanding of the risk 
of human-induced climate 
change” (IPCC 2009). 
LDC Least Developed Countries – 49 
countries cooperating on issues 
of vulnerability and adaptation 
to climate change (UNFCCC 
2009e). 
Umbrella group Have evolved from the 
JUSCANZ-group at the time of 
Kyoto negotiations and is 
(usually) made up by Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine and the US 
(UNFCCC 2009e).  
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